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ON THE DANGEROUS GAME OF  
COLLABORATING WITH NAZIS:  
AN HISTORICO-SOCIO-LEGAL RECONSTRUCTION OF THAT 
FORGOTTEN PAST LOCATED WITHIN SILENCE, ABSENCE AND 




Abstract:   
Responses to the deliberately provocative title are contextualised within this writer’s 
research findings to date concerning the Allied investigation and prosecution of ‘minor’ war 
crimes trials after WWII. From these the writer considered the survival of certain categories 
of Nazi thought, permitting some critical legal theorists to admit the Nazi Carl Schmitt and his 
anti-liberal concept of ‘concrete orders’ into its canon of critical texts. In this, some theorists 
appear concerned more with testing or searching for a ‘pure idea’ of law than noting a moral 
absence within such legal scholarship. That is, the nature of the transgressive, taboo-
breaking, politically and culturally sanctioned behaviour of the Nazi state to which Schmit 
and others contributed. In order to widen this debate this work considers neglected 
alternative contemporary and co-existing legal and cultural norms revealed in the actions of 
Allied soldiers prosecuting Germans and others for appalling breaches of legal and human 
rights.  
 
The work follows an original methodology in drawing upon research into the actions of 
individuals, British soldiers, of Nazi theorists and of the German post war population’s 
silence. Its aim is to recontextualise Schmitt’s work within his very political commitment to 
the Nazi cause. This article further suggests that decency, understood as a personal sense 
of justice within shared cultural and political values, serves as an alternative if less elegant 
framework to counter the tendency of legal theory to devalue the human. A further question 
thus emerges: do some strands of modern theory, as occurred under Nazi rule, collude in 
this devaluation by failing to acknowledge and validate positive human cultural values as a 
defence against perverse political pressures that lead inevitably to the corruption of legal 
process and law itself? 
 
Keywords: ‘Minor’ war crimes trials; British Army; Schmitt; critical legal studies 
  
Introduction 
This article considers liberal common law. It illuminates justice upheld in war crimes 
prosecutions; justice that appears in a positive and beneficial light when placed against the 
critique of liberalism by Nazi theorist Carl Schmitt and some contemporary writers within 
Critical Legal Theory (CLT). In order to shed that light, this critique of Schmitt and his 
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contemporary admirers draws upon the author’s own research. This involves a focus on the 
investigation and prosecution of Nazi and other war criminals by the British Army in 
Occupied Germany from 1945-8.2 These military prosecutions, known as the ‘minor’ trials to 
differentiate them from the International Military Tribunal’s prosecution of the ‘major’ war 
criminals at Nuremberg, were undertaken by all the Allies in their Zones of Occupation under 
the legal authority of Control Council Order No. 10, issued December 1945. The 
methodology adopts a ‘bottom up’ approach to reconstructing the ‘minor’ trials.3 In the final 
section, this article sets the investigation culminating in a ‘minor’ trial and its jurisprudential 
and ethical context against the rejection of liberal law epitomised by Schmitt and an extreme 
strand within CLT as displayed, particularly, in an article by Salter and Twist.4 The war 
crimes research also revealed certain aspects of human behaviour involved in the delivery of 
justice other than those normally associated with the study of Nazi war crimes: notably those 
associated with a value for human decency, something demonstrated on a daily basis by 
Allied soldiers and others involved in the prosecutions.5  
 
War crimes research to date reveals much that has been neglected and undervalued, 
extending even to the recognition of the volume of trials; probably 356 in the British Zone 
(yet the transcripts are held at The National Archives, Kew).6 The neglect includes an 
awareness of those extraordinary efforts made by serving soldiers, many of them lawyers, to 
ensure that some at least of the guilty were brought to justice as those soldiers understood 
it; a very different ‘justice’ from that in Germany under Nazi rule. The importance of these 
findings is that they emphasise the significance of cultural, social and political norms in the 
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administration of justice, revealing very different contemporary perspectives (between 
German and Allied citizens) towards ideas of legality, justice and process.7  
 
These findings have led the writer to a methodological focus that considers the historical 
context of legal scholarship which formed part of Nazi culture, specifically the Nazi jurist Carl 
Schmitt. It is Schmitt’s legal scholarship which has served to legitimise transgressive cultural 
norms (including expressions of subtly anti-Semitic scholarship) that is today pursued by 
some within CLT, largely without its Nazi context. As a result, although there are extensive 
publications available revealing much about theorists and their fulsome involvement within 
the National Socialist project;8 what is often missing is the incorporation of this material into 
contemporary discussions. This paradox forms the inspiration for this paper. 
 
In this context, the writer takes her stance as an historian of law’s pervasiveness using a rich 
variety of sources in her research to illuminate the issues involved. As a result, although the 
methodology takes as its locus the archival research it draws upon other topics to spiral 
around that study. The approach is not linear, rather it adopts a helical framework of issues 
and questions to challenge and destabilise developing orthodoxies within critical legal 
studies. Although a metaphorical construct, intellectually this model of a helix illuminates the 
methodological structure of the piece. The strands of that helix consist of the soldiers 
investigating and prosecuting war crimes and the survival, within some aspects of CLT, of 
anti-liberal Carl Schmitt whose legal and other writings from 1933 as Hitler came to power, 
provided the Nazi regime with intellectual and jurisprudential legitimacy. This strand, 
illuminating an ethics-free, value-neutral approach to law, reveals a Nazi voice speaking 
within CLT. Finally, those points at which the various strands of the helix intellectually 
interact provide complex but meaningful signposts in this piece.  
 
It is acknowledged that the perspective is liberal and is motivated by a concern with the 
effects of, and relationships between, individuals who contribute to collective human 
behaviour creating and reinforcing cultural norms. To achieve this purpose, the work coils 
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around history and forgetting, from collective to individual behaviour, all set against a 
background of shifting pre and post war societal norms, where the German people and Nazi 
theorists alike struggled for survival. Silence in this work includes that of Germans in wartime 
continued by some within CLT. This writer suggests that such a powerful behavioural pattern 
permits, authorises and still endorses an intellectual reverence towards Schmitt absent the 
requirement to confront problematic ethical concerns.9  
 
The key to this article is the concept of ‘human decency’; can it ever be inherent, situational, 
and/or conventional? Its elusive presence is glimpsed in the actions and attitudes of serving 
battle-hardened British soldiers who investigated and prosecuted war crimes, beginning that 
task in the middle of battle. Years of hard fighting did not produce in them the level of 
institutionalised brutality they uncovered in evidence. Although German citizens and British 
soldiers were temporally and geographically congruent in 1945, to the British, their German 
prisoners’ behaviour was utterly alien, unthinkable. German society itself was fully complicit 
in those acts, its jurists too were part of a cultural framework that facilitated and accepted the 
horrors. For that reason, this article posits the question: how are legal theorists able to gloss 
the obscenity of Nazi Germany underpinning these texts? It does not find a satisfactory 
answer.   
 
As noted above the intellectual structure of this article is helical, but its methodology may be 
more classically described as interdisciplinary. This writer has written elsewhere in support 
of Hutchinson’s call for an end to that arbitrary division between jurisprudence and politics 
and also concerning the value of historical reconstructions within socio-legal studies.10 In 
addition, in order to illuminate theory’s ahistorical turn this writer, as suggested by Bartlett, 
has widened the methodology to include theory-based elements within this reconstruction.11 
A further influence is Seymour’s perceptive analysis of the relationship between critical 
theory, anti-Semitism, ressentiment and absence.12 Of particular value was that writer’s 
suggestion (albeit nuanced) that critical theory has come to take on some of the 
characteristics it challenges where it asserts that there is: ‘[S]omething about the modern era 
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in general and emancipation in particular that brings with it a specific Jewish dimension’.13 
The range of sources and disciplines invoked in this article have led to the writer adopting a 
synthesis within and beyond the boundaries of interdisciplinarity, drawing upon the model of 
a helix as an intellectual framework to structure this work. In summary, this article maps 
theory and biography onto a foundation of archival war crimes research. Finally, in order to 
underline the contemporary relevance of such historico-socio-legal reconstructions, the 
article closes with the deconstruction of a widely-available (because on-line) article as an 
exemplar of those trends that minimise Nazi elements within Schmitt’s theories.  
 
It must be emphasised that this project began specifically as socio-legal archival research to 
reconstruct the lived experience of investigators and prosecutors involved in Allied ‘minor’ 
war crimes trials. What became increasingly evident, however, is the scale of that cognitive 
dissonance in 1945 between German and British attitudes towards what we acknowledge as 
common Western European values concerning, law, justice and decency. An absence of 
intellectual discourse concerning the implications of that dissonance, particularly for legal 
scholarship, broadened the research project. This subsequently included an exploration of 
the implications of silence; drawing in turn upon methodology developed by Fraser in order 
to revisit contextually the significance of Nazi legal theory.14 Thus the eloquence of silences 
surrounding that German past are revealed to permit interpretations of multiple meanings 
and wider significance; not solely of the silences of the past, but more, how silence 
continues to ‘speak’ to us today.     
 
1 On Reconstructing Allied ‘Minor’ War Crimes Trials  
It is notable that research into ‘minor’ trials to date has been very limited and what has been 
produced has both developed and subsequently entrenched a negative orthodoxy, focusing 
on failures to prosecute; few trials [sic], ‘victor’s justice’ and alleged ‘failures’ of legal 
process.15 However, the research project to date has led this writer to arrive at rather 
different conclusions; that much of this activity revealed the ethical power of the liberal 
common law in action. Within the Allied Zones many thousands of war criminals were 
prosecuted in spite of the chaos that reigned in defeated Germany. In addition, in the British 
Zone serving soldiers, victims and army lawyers were closely connected within the legal 
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process and most demonstrated a high level of professional competence and/or personal 
commitment to their task. This is evident from the very beginning of this process, before and 
during the British Belsen Trial 1945;16 the first ‘minor’ trial by the Western Allies in Occupied 
Germany. In consequence, those who handled this matter on the ground were venturing into 
entirely new legal territory.  
 
As originally envisaged by the British, such military prosecutions would primarily be for the 
mis-treatment of Allied prisoners of war.17 However, the situation revealed at Belsen 
transcended such parochial considerations, although the legal issues concerning 
prosecutions remained a live question until the trial itself. As one investigator notes:  
The British concern with Belsen Camp is based from the War Crimes point of view 
almost entirely on the fact that it was in the British fighting area and is in the British 
area of occupation. Such war crimes as have been committed have been committed 
against prisoners of many nationalities, but only one has come to light of a British 
Prisoner of War who was confined in the Camp and in whose case a crime is 
proved.18 
 
This reconstruction takes as its starting point the perspective of those who were entrusted 
with a new role; serving soldiers of the British Army formed into War Crimes Investigation 
Teams (WCIT) as the scale of the crimes committed at Belsen and elsewhere unfolded. 
Archival sources held at the National Archives and the Imperial War Museum concerning the 
Belsen investigations contain formal and informal correspondence, scribbled notes, lists of 
accused and their crimes, wanted and detained prisoners and the first Interim Report on war 
crimes at Belsen and gas chamber(s) at Auschwitz. That Report recommended 
prosecutions; detailed methods of taking statements; and contained medical and other 
information on Belsen along with much more. Most harrowing are the accounts (one written 
on the day Belsen was liberated) of conditions in that camp immediately upon arrival and 
what measures were undertaken to ameliorate those conditions and begin the desperate 
attempt to save as many lives as possible, all whilst battle continued around the camp. Much 
of this material formed the basis of witness statements and affidavits in the trial and is drawn 
on below. 
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Bergen-Belsen concentration camp exploded onto public consciousness on 15 April 1945.19 
There were dead bodies in piles, at least 10,000.20 Thousands more men, women and 
children were in the last stages of starvation, some dying as the British entered the camp 
and many for weeks afterwards (some 500 a day in the first weeks after liberation).21 There 
was sickness, most recently typhus; and amongst the sick and dying moved healthy male 
and female SS camp officials, Hungarian soldiers and the Wehrmacht, initially still acting as 
‘guards’.22 Shocked British soldiers also walked amongst the Nazi victims – viewed as if from 
another world. Reporters, photographers, film crews came to Belsen. They experienced and, 
day-by-day, reported back. Richard Dimbleby recorded a broadcast immediately after visiting 
the camp, but the BBC, hardly believing what he said, waited for a few days in order to 
confirm his story before broadcasting it to the nation.23 Belsen was a humanitarian disaster 
that nearly defeated the British Army, still engaged in actively fighting the Germans. Those 
serving soldiers, devastated by what they found, felt an absolute need to photograph, film 
and write, recording Bergen-Belsen in those first weeks and beyond; realising that otherwise 
no one would believe them, ironically foreshadowing the Holocaust denials of David Irving 
and others. One RAF officer wrote: ‘I was anxious to take the opportunity of seeing with my 
own eyes. If in five years time I hear people saying that Belsen etc. were so much 
propaganda, I shall be in a position to argue from conviction’.24  
 
The legal foundations of British war crimes trials have been reconstructed elsewhere, 
including contemporary concerns about the use of field courts-martial procedures amended 
by Royal Warrant.25 This was issued on 18 June 1945 in order to bring those charged with 
war crimes to trial within the British Zone.26 Most contentious were the amendments to the 
rules of evidence.27 It should however be noted, that those accused were not charged with 
common law murder, rather: ‘murder as a war crime’. Under the terms of Regulation 9, a 
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guilty verdict gave the possibility of death sentence, not the mandatory death sentence 
required in British criminal trials in the 1940s. This in some way tempers the retroactive 
nature of parts of this legal process, a topic not within the remit of this article. 
 
In reality, exactly how this would all work in practice was the subject of on-going concern to 
army lawyers and investigators in the months before the Belsen Trial began. For example, 
archival sources reveal that investigators expressed concern that depositions should be ‘on 
the face of them, reasonable; otherwise in court – or shall we say in a British court - they will 
throw them out and acquit the prisoner.’28 In addition, as the rules of evidence were relaxed 
by the terms of the Warrant, the investigators were concerned that witnesses might not 
differentiate between hearsay and direct evidence. However, they found that once the 
difference was explained, witnesses showed: ‘complete frankness’, in stating which evidence 
was, and which evidence was not, hearsay’.29  
 
It is also clear from surviving records that investigators were involved in the decision-making 
processes concerning trials. For example, in July 1945 then Lt. Col. Leo Genn Officer 
Commanding No. 1 WCIT (see below) was in England for a conference on the matter. This 
was not a smooth process; Lt. Col. ‘Geoff’ Champion, his second-in-command, notes that 
Colonel Backhouse, chief prosecutor for the trial, was also attending a meeting in England 
 with nearly every lawyer in the Kingdom as far as I can gather … [the] result of this 
distinguished gathering will probably be confusion worse confounded, but may 
enable Col. Backhouse to give concrete directions.30 
 
At this point Champion is reflecting upon those practical and legal issues that are raised 
within Genn’s Interim Report. These recommended prosecution of camp officials, 
Wehrmacht and Hungarian soldiers (no soldiers were brought to trial) and others for 
atrocities committed largely against Jews in pursuit of, or as a result of, the Nazi Final 
Solution. Although not clear at the time, this was beginning to emerge from witness 
statements obtained at Belsen and became publicly visible within the subsequent trial.  
 
No. 1 WCIT arrived at Belsen only four weeks before they produced their ‘Interim Report’ 
dated 22 June 1945. It is thus apparent that the Team began investigations before details 
concerning the precise legal framework or jurisdiction had been finalised. However, their 
methods of inquiry, of taking affidavits etc., make it clear that they are following a pre-
existing sense of appropriate behaviour in criminal investigations; bringing what they 
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understand about due legal process into the bizarre transgressive world of Belsen. Although 
a work in progress, that Report reveals that their investigative remit had rapidly moved 
beyond Belsen to encompass those committed at ‘OTHER CONCENTRATION CAMPS from 
1940-1945’.31 The volume of information available both from Belsen detainees and in 
statements from SS and other officials all of whom had been in a variety of camps 
undoubtedly drove such a decision. This particular build-up of available evidence was a 
direct consequence of Belsen’s peculiar characteristic of final destination for those prisoners 
who survived the death marches from the East as the Germans retreated from the Russian 
Army advance. 
 
Genn, the author of this Report, was a qualified barrister and well known (Jewish) actor, who 
served with the Royal Artillery.32 There is an additional signature; that of Champion, ‘owner’ 
of the copy drawn from here. He emerges from these documents as possessing a strong 
commitment to his role, a dry sense of humour and a good, close working relationship with 
his commanding officer. The file contains a list of additional typed amendments, corrections 
and comments by Champion, where he notes: 
I feel rather amazed that in the rush and bustle of getting it done, even with my able 
assistance and suggesting deletions of “and” and substitution of “or”, could have 
produced a document which on leisurely consideration seems to have set out so 
concisely and clearly the main issues.33 
    
If this seems frivolous, if any reader may be led to believe that these officers merely retained 
a wry detachment, then there is another comment by Champion to Genn, hand-written in the 
margin: 
Possibly special mention might be made of the number of child victims, dead or 
riddled with T.B. – having regard to the crimes against these, I should like to amend 
the Royal Warrant, to death by breaking on the wheel – but I have no hope of 
acceptance of this idea.34 
 
Clearly these investigators were overcoming personal disgust and many other emotions yet 
they continuously expressed concern to ensure that the ‘best’ evidence only be used, and 
that this was obtained and carefully recorded. It may be that these two very English middle-
class lawyers, Genn and Champion, felt obliged to obtain witness statements in a fashion 
that complied so far as was possible, with that legal culture in which they practised and 
experienced law at ‘home’; the English common law tradition. Moreover, in so doing they 
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were putting clear water between English ‘legality’ and that ‘lawfulness’ so many of the 
accused claimed in their defence. Plus, of course there is a strong sense of professionalism 
in their records; perhaps self-justificatory. But that is no different from views expressed by Sir 
Thomas Hetherington in his Report of the War Crimes Inquiry 1989.35 In this Report, Genn 
set out the size of the task facing these investigators at Belsen. In summary, he estimated 
that initially there were ‘some 55,000 potential witnesses sick or healthy, distributed over an 
area of several square miles’; that the task of bringing some sort of order to the camps was 
‘Herculean’. In spite of the magnitude of this task the Team retained their concerns that 
Depositions should be scrupulously obtained.36 As a corollary to this aspect, investigators 
were greatly concerned as to the value of the evidence given by former prisoners, in the 
context of the severe privations these victims had experienced. Thus in those cases where ‘it 
was apparent that the witnesses’ experiences had not had inconsiderable effect on his or her 
mental outlook’, no deposition was taken.37  
 
Pressures on the investigators must have been considerable. They arrived at Belsen on 20 
May 1945; their Interim Report was issued on 22 June.38 The trial of 45 defendants began 19 
September and lasted three months. Of 13 charged with war crimes at Belsen and 
Auschwitz: six were found guilty for both; one guilty for Belsen; four guilty for Auschwitz; two 
not guilty. Of the 32 charged with war crimes committed at Belsen; 20 were found guilty. In 
total, 11 death sentences and one life sentence were passed down. The remainder found 
guilty were given sentences ranging from one to 15 years imprisonment. 
 
The minimal research undertaken in these trials to date has ensured that those 
achievements by soldiers who investigated and took part in this and subsequent war crimes 
prosecutions have been consistently overlooked. So too is the Belsen reality from the point 
of liberation, potential witnesses (victims), rescuers, investigators, accused and lawyers 
came together in that place; many remaining there until the trial five months later. Following 
the participants’ perspective provides one platform from which to provide alternative 
reconstructions that perhaps satisfies Fraser’s critique (in summary) that historicity 
concerning ‘perpetrator’ trials exemplifies a concern with various ideological aspects of law, 
culture, politics and history in the creation of a collective Holocaust memory.39 Unlike such 
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teleological historicity, approaching the trials from a socio-legal perspective reveals that in a 
very intimate and intimidating physical environment, British army investigators retained a 
strong sense of the ‘transgressive and taboo-breaking’ nature of what we now understand as 
the Holocaust.40 And more that at all points the soldiers scrupulously differentiated their 
behaviour from that of their German prisoners. 
 
Undoubtedly, the actions of WCIT soldiers reflect their social, legal and political norms. But 
other very different norms co-existed and the next thread in the methodological helix 
presents an account of German silence. This section will be followed by a return to the 
individual, the German legal academic Carl Schmitt, specifically to consider his role in 
providing an intellectual framework supporting social and political norms whose horrific 
endpoint the British Army encountered in Belsen on 15 April 1945. It will consider how 
Schmitt continued actively to support the Nazi regime; and how ‘silence’ and the collusion of 
academics (possibly unaware of the dimensions revealed here) continues to veil the extent 
of his personal guilt.  
 
2 On the Power of Silence  
It is undeniable that social attitudes and behaviour underpin and validate all legal structures 
and law itself. Thus Germany, a modern Western European state, enabled, ordered, and 
sanctioned its citizens’ taboo-breaking behaviour, all the while ensuring that it was publicly 
unmentionable: a shared shame.  
Most of you know what it means when 100 corpses lie there, or when 500 corpses lie 
there. To have gone through this and – apart from a few exceptions caused by 
human weakness – to have remained decent, that has made us great. That is a page 
of glory in our history that has never been written and which will never be written … 
(Himmler’s speech at Posen 1943).41  
 
By this deliberate tactic, Nazi Germany and its citizens circumvented public conscience as a 
social construct, permitting evil as physically possible, acceptable, even natural. That 
process of silence continued after defeat and enabled the post-war German population to 
claim: ‘We did not know’. The taboo was not the doing but the talking about what was done. 
Importantly, in the ‘minor’ trials Allied soldiers in Germany broke that taboo, enabling victims 
to speaking publicly and some trials were widely reported. But most Germans remained 
silent.  
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However, the British Army too has taboos and restraints. All the records of the investigations 
and the trial transcripts held in War Office files at Kew are labelled ‘TOP SECRET’. In 
addition, in 1945, WCIT soldiers had to overcome personal emotions in order to perform 
properly public social, military and legal roles. Those duties and perhaps their decency and 
the imperatives attached to Army files combined largely to prevent any expression of anger; 
but not those expressions found in the margins of their reports in personal file copies where 
occasionally soldiers recorded their feelings. Most notably, Geoff Champion, solicitor and JP 
from Tenterden in Kent, in breach of all army regulations, took his ‘Top Secret’ Belsen file 
home and thence to the Imperial War Museum, ensuring that it would be read one day. His 
legacy short-circuited the ‘secrecy’ of War Office files (closed until at least 1968; some 
remain closed today) and also bypassed the military taboo of silence to allow us to hear his 
voice and that of his colleagues, telling the world their ‘real’ story of Belsen. In this there is 
resonance with Gunter Grass in Peeling the Onion who has broken his very German silence 
to reveal his truth; that of a juvenile Nazi past. This too is what Habermas called for in his 
statement in the 1987 Historikerstreit, that the memory of the suffering of those murdered be 
kept alive openly, not just in people’s minds.  
 
The reality is, during the Nazi regime the majority of the population were aware that their 
leaders were passing all the boundaries of human behaviour, for that reason those actions 
took on an aura of the unbelievable. This enabled some quite extra-ordinary self-
justifications to emerge. 
Once again the human psyche demonstrated the ability to manipulate, encapsulate 
or repress events in such a way as to make them bearable. The foundations for the 
post-war strategies of exculpation were laid early.42 
 
In consequence, it can be asserted that German silence does not necessarily represent 
collective shame. For that silent majority it reflects both anger and an absence of a sense of 
personal guilt; their actions were those of loyal citizens of the Reich. In spite of this, there 
was always a risk of being indicted for war crimes, many such trials were held in Germany 
from the 1950s in both the Eastern Zone and the BRD. That possibility continues today: on 2 
September 2013 the trial of Siert Bruins, a 92-year-old Dutch-born naturalised German 
commenced at Hagen, near Dortmund in Germany.43 He is accused of executing a Dutch 
resistance fighter Aldert Klaas Dijkema in 1944, having already served a prison sentence in 
Germany in the 1980s for his part in the wartime murder of two Dutch Jews. This is a 
continuation of the doctrine set out in May 2008 when the Simon Wiesenthal Centre 
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released its ‘most wanted’ list of Nazi war criminals, all males in their 80s and 90s. The 
release states: ‘the passage of time in no way diminishes the guilt of the perpetrators’.44 
However, many former SS did extremely well after the war; an SS past was no barrier to 
worldly success in West Germany.45 It is therefore not surprising that few of those actively 
involved, or who lived as adults through Germany’s Nazi era either spoke of, or expressed 
regret at that past. This recognition is required in order to understand how notorious 
disgraced Nazi theorist Schmitt could continue to live in post-war Germany without becoming 
a social pariah. In short, only Nazis who found themselves in the Russian Zone after 1944-5, 
and those with a high profile on war crimes wanted lists felt it necessary to flee Germany. 
 
3 On the Eloquence of Silence: Introducing Carl Schmitt, the Great 
Fabricator  
This section will consider the professional life of Schmitt including the significance of ‘silence’ 
as a major aspect of the survival of his work. This section also forms a connecting strand to 
the decontextualised work (their silence?) of modern CLT scholars discussed below. It is 
clear that silence is a powerful protective psychological weapon, both on personal and 
political levels. A convention of silence, however created, becomes orthodoxy, constituting 
‘normal’ social good behaviour. As a result, breaking silence became not simply a broad 
cultural taboo in post-war Germany; it constituted bad manners. For example, Stolleis a 
German legal historian, reveals that after 1950, it was considered ‘tactless’ for academic 
lawyers to speak about Nazi constitutional law and the involvement of specific individuals; 
that by doing so one ran the ‘danger of insulting a colleague’.46 More, the German word, 
Taktlos, carries an inherent meaning of crass bad-manners, unthinkable in respectable 
German bourgeois society. That cultural norm with its emphasis upon formal politeness, 
facilitated by a shared sense of being an elite leadership group, thus enabled a new post war 
beginning for legal academics.47 All of these, bar a very few returning refugees and those in 
the Russian Military Zone where anti-Nazi policies were strictly pursued, were professor-
collaborators under the Nazi regime; teaching Nazi law and ideology to their students.  
 
It is evident that post-war patterns of silence originated within the Nazi regime. As a result, 
during that period the silence was deafening amongst all established and organised elites in 
Nazi Germany. As Bauman notes, Hitler’s capture of state power in Germany did not change 
those rules of professional conduct that remained loyal to  
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The principle of the moral neutrality of reason and the pursuit of rationality … 
German universities, like their counterparts in other modern countries, carefully 
cultivated the idea of science as an emphatically value-free activity; they bestowed 
upon their wards the right and duty to serve the “interests of knowledge” and to brush 
aside other interests with which the welfare of scientific pursuits might clash.48  
 
This quotation might be read as a positive endorsement. This writer both understands and 
presents it as a damning statement, as did Baumann himself she argues. It is this approach 
which permits some CLT scholars to remove Nazism from the Nazi theorist. What mattered 
to scholars then and now (perhaps) was the preservation of their integrity as spokesmen of 
Reason. Consequently, their task[s] did not include concerns with ethical meaning and their 
ordinary life continued. In their surrender, German legal academics moved from shame to 
pride; as accomplices they had to deal with cognitive dissonances generated by complicity. 
This later allowed professional rejoicing, for example, in the blessed cleanliness of the 
universities purged of all Jewish influence.49  
 
It is within this framework that we can begin to find additional meaning in post-war responses 
to and explanations for, the silences surrounding Schmitt. These served to conceal the 
extent to which he exercised his considerable intellectual talents to assist, promote and 
legitimate the political values of the Third Reich. Thus Schmitt was ‘protected’ by German 
post-war cultural discretion, supported in various ways by those academics invested in his 
work. Of course, he could not keep his Nazi past secret, but by selective silences and 
manipulation could minimise the damage and any risk of prosecution by the government of 
the BRD.50 Through this strategy, he ‘enabled’ his readers to lose sight of the centrality of 
that Nazi project in which he fully participated. But today, as Muller and Stolleis’ publications 
are now widely available to English-speaking scholars, especially those containing 
revelations concerning Schmitt and his foundational role in Nazi legal scholarship (see later), 
it is disquieting that a ‘value-free’ approach to his work continues mirroring Bauman’s 
depiction of Nazi scholarship above.  
 
This leads to another ‘intersection’ point within the methodological helix that synergises the 
main strands of this article. Namely, that such complex but significant connections between 
life and thought raise profound ethical questions concerning that current affirmation of the 
utility of Schmitt’s legal theories. In his fall, although fractured and broken by the extreme 
conditions of his time, Schmitt could still find intellectual support in post-war Germany and 
from the wider academic world despite a Nazi past. This antimony permits theorists to read 
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Schmitt’s work written from a Nazi standpoint whilst presenting their research in a quasi-
critical framework. This article questions if, in that rejection of boundaries, theorists are 
transgressing ethical norms.  
 
If this is so, then it is morally repugnant that decontextualised scholarship based upon Nazi 
theory has become intellectually acceptable in some quarters.51 One explanation for this 
state of affairs may be situated in that presumed link maintained by philosophers, between 
philosophy and virtue.52 Dominick LaCapra is a historian who, in his work on Holocaust and 
memory, has reflected at length upon this question. He defines such behaviour as 
amounting to complex interactions between the personal, the political and the text.53 Thus, 
text, author and reader are bound in time and space – none fixed, since people and 
language all change with time. Perhaps the honest approach is to explore and define every 
influence on each element – author, text and reader – and to situate them in different times 
and places in order to provide a multi-dimensional portrait of the past. Consequentially, 
material with value and meaning from one perspective, political viewpoint, or historical 
moment may appear disjointed, even transgressive from another. To that end, LaCapra 
suggests we examine contemporary responses specifically to reveal elements of 
transference in that exchange between past and present. What follows will attempt that 
exercise. 
     
5 On Nazi Legal Academics: Unmasking Carl Schmitt  
From 1949 in Germany, there was a general if duplicitous consensus amongst legal 
academics not to speak of the recent past (for now). Silence was the pre-requisite for a new 
beginning – along with shared nationalist, anti-communist and Cold War views 
(consideration of the latter does not form part of this work) all framed within the certainty of 
belonging to a leadership group.54 Such tactics did not aid any coming to terms with the past. 
Consequently, the role of German lawyers during the Third Reich still presents one of the 
greatest challenges to the legitimacy and status of the contemporary German legal 
establishment.  
 
In consequence, the juristic nature of Nazi Germany continues to reverberate and disturb 
legal equanimity today. As a result of his own position, that is an academic trained within that 
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long unbroken German legal tradition, Stolleis’ Law under the Swastika provides an often-
painful reflective insider’s account of practitioners and judges in Nazi Germany, of the nature 
of Nazi legality and law. Of particular interest is the book’s final section, concerning 1945 
onwards. It constitutes a damning account that spares few and highlights how the legal 
profession escaped social ostracism for prosecution and punishments they unjustly inflicted 
upon so many during their years of loyal service to Nazi rule. It is highly significant that after 
the US Judges Trial at Nuremberg 1947, not a single judge was put on trial in West 
Germany for his [sic] activities under National Socialism.55 Stolleis has similarly 
reconstructed the extensive and ignoble career of German legal academics in A History of 
Public Law in Germany 1914-1945. Supreme amongst those academics, Schmitt was 
regarded as the political theorist both of the collapse of the Weimar Republic and of the Nazi 
regime.56  
 
And yet, in spite of his past, Schmitt remains of great interest to theorists today. In 
consequence, this section has two purposes; the first is to re-connect Schmitt’s Nazi 
ideology with his publications and thereby shed light on those political motives underpinning 
his work. The second is to provide a framework for the case study at the end of the article, 
illustrating certain aspects of the current reception of Schmitt’s theories. It is important to 
note at this point that the most consistent part of Schmitt’s worldview, implicit within all his 
writing, is its thread of German-ness and the importance of Heimat. This concept does not 
directly translate into English, but is a quality of belonging to place possessed by every 
German. It was stolen from German Jews and is a fundamental and traditional element of 
German blood and Volk. Heimat is ‘understood’ and central throughout Schmitt’s work and 
life. For example, it underpins Schmitt’s connection of the concept of the partisan to that of 
territory in The Theory of the Partisan published in 1963.57 Any contemporary scholar 
seeking to mine Schmitt’s writings as a basis for critical analysis does violence to the 
academic project by failing to acknowledge this ultra-nationalist Germanic basis at its heart. 
Through all his incarnations, Schmitt remained a patriotic German.58  
 
In short, Schmitt was amongst the most prominent and renowned scholars who professed 
themselves followers of National Socialism.59 He was enormously and ruthlessly ambitious; 
Stolleis describes him as ‘ambiguously multifaceted’, placing him within a group formed 
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during the last years of the Weimar Republic, who viewed themselves as ‘young rightists’.60 
As extensive biographical details concerning Schmitt’s life have now been published in 
English, this article will concern itself solely with Schmitt’s Nazi engagement, as personal 
ambition moved him to join the Nazi Party in 1933.61 The period from 1936 to 1945 requires 
underlining as it is still being incorrectly characterised by some writers. As a result of this, in 
a version built upon Schmitt’s own silence, lies and other influences, some scholars repeat 
his own claim. This runs that from 1936-1945, Schmitt allegedly ‘fell from power’ as the Nazi 
apparatus, ‘turned against him.’ That position, although manifestly not so, has increasingly 
become orthodoxy, and thus requires specific attention here.  
 
The facts reveal that in 1932 Schmitt’s was a rising academic star; his connections at the 
highest level within the Weimar Republic, combined with his academic reputation had 
secured him a position as law professor at the University of Köln. At that point he had hopes 
of a future professorship in Berlin. The regime change made that impossible without Party 
support, and so Schmitt joined the Nazi Party. From this time onwards, it is now well 
established that he devoted himself both to the Party and his own career. For 12 years his 
work provided legal ‘legitimacy’ for the Third Reich. Schmitt was awarded the most 
prestigious academic post, the Chair of Public Law in Berlin in 1933 and additional 
appointments from the State.62 Meanwhile, his Jewish former colleagues were excluded from 
the universities, deprived of their citizenship, and if fortunate, escaped into exile. In addition, 
he rapidly acquired international fame as a fascist, meeting Mussolini in 1936.63 He was at 
this point a loyal servant to the regime protected both by Goering and his own ever more 
rabid anti-Semitism. This is explicit in his notorious address: ‘Jewry in Legal Studies’ 
delivered to open a conference of German jurists in 1936: 
We need to liberate the German spirit from all Jewish falsifications, falsifications of 
the concept of spirit which have made it possible for Jewish emigrants to label the 
great struggle of Gauleiter Julius Streicher as something unspiritual.64  
 
Schmitt’s most influential contribution to Nazi ‘legality’ emerged from his writings on 
jurisprudence. Briefly, Schmitt deconstructs jurisprudence into three divisions: normative, 
positivist and concrete orders, rejecting the first two. The latter, illustrated by analogy with 
medieval institutions, concerns the force and integrity of social groupings. Within these, 
‘rules’ develop organically via consensus and thus individuals are (should be) judged 
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according to the standards (concrete orders) of the order to which they belong. Soldiers, 
clergy, bureaucracies and members of a family constitute such orders.65 Further, Schmitt 
asserts that ‘the legitimacy of judges’ decisions is not to be based upon the content and 
derivation of the law but on what was authorised by the State’.66 This transmuted into the 
Nazi slogan: ‘concrete thinking about order and organisation’:67 Schmitt’s contribution. He 
modified earlier writings to provide ‘concrete order formation’ with an amorphous, but 
manifestly National Socialist slant.68 His work, Über die Drei Arten was seminal in this 
achievement; published in 1934, it also forms the basis of the article identified for later 
deconstruction).69 In consequence, in the elevation of his brutal reality philosophy Schmitt 
rendered his greatest service to the Nazi system.70 Nonetheless, in an increasingly factional 
political system, Schmitt fell foul of internal Nazi and university intrigues from 1936 as 
younger, ambitious (and more committed) Nazis elbowed him aside. His enemies played 
upon his Catholic background (although he was excommunicated by the Church in 1926)71 
and his former Jewish acquaintances.72 Both were true of many Germans before 1935. In 
response, Schmitt continued to engage in specific anti-Semitic propaganda to re-affirm his 
Nazi credentials.73 Although forced to resign from some of his positions, he remained a 
Berlin law professor and continued his academic career.  
 
In summary, Schmitt did not abandon his ambitions for academic success in the Third Reich. 
Instead, he re-invented himself as an international lawyer. He continued to provide legal 
justifications for the actions of the Third Reich, this time German expansionism. In 1939, two 
weeks after the fall of Czechoslovakia, he was invited to lecture on Grossraum at the Kiel 
Institute of International Law. Furthermore, at home his publications on this subject elevated 
Grossraum to a ‘principle’ of world politics, permanently associating his name with German 
expansionism, the Third Reich and its ‘World Order’. In this context, an attempt to revive 
Schmitt’s Grossraum theories as a useful theoretical tool in contemporary critical discourse 
on (neo)liberalism has been challenged as ‘indissolubly tied up with Nazi ideology and 
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political purpose’.74 Later, during 1942 and 1943, Schmitt was officially permitted to tour 
Bucharest, Budapest, Madrid, Coimra, Barcelona and Leipzig, delivering lectures on: ‘The 
State of European Jurisprudence’.75 Some of these international connections continued after 
the war, when Schmitt maintained his links with Fascist regimes in Spain and Portugal and, 
from 1948, Opus Dei.76  
 
It is apparent that, although the Party initially lauded him, in common with most German 
academics he became side-lined as the project moved on beyond concerns of legality and 
philosophy, to propaganda and totalitarianism. However, Schmitt remained part of the 
‘establishment’; a respected and influential (if not as much as he wished) professor and, like 
all ambitious academics, took advantage of any career opportunities.  As a result, despite his 
assertions to American interrogators at Nuremberg in 1947, that he had no longer been any 
part of the Nazi project after 1936,77 it must be noted that he had still been permitted to 
lecture and even to travel abroad and publish. Such activities emphasise how close he 
remained to the regime.78 One case in point is Leviathan (1938), where Schmitt combined a 
melancholy retrospective on the state with the vilest anti-Semitism.79  He also held the chair 
of the Committee for Administrative Law in the Academy for German Law from 1939-1942.80 
In summary, he remained a force in the academic milieu and a Party member to the end of 
the war.81 At that point, he refused to co-operate with De-Nazification requirements – thereby 
ensuring no official record appears today in those particular files.82 He was held by the 
Americans at Nuremberg for a year, ‘assisting’ enquiries. On his release he was given a life-
time ban from German Universities, (the only professor to be so treated) first by the Allies, 
then confirmed by the West German Government.  
 
However, many powerful challenges to Schmitt, as theorist and individual have appeared: 
from Franz Neumann’s Behemoth (1944) to recent historical reconstructions,83 and from 
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within studies into critical legal theory.84 These include many critiques of Schmitt’s work and 
intellectual position, not least by Habermas.85 However, unlike Habermas, perhaps also 
more in line with the thrust of this article, Lubbe (second only to Habermas as a German 
‘public’ philosopher) argues that political debate and political decision-making should be 
underpinned by an acute consciousness of the: ‘contingency (and brevity) of political and 
individual life’. Lubbe retains a sense of the ‘sheer fragility of political order’.86 Writing from 
the 1950s onwards, Lubbe selectively appropriates Schmitt’s thought in order to strengthen 
liberal democracy and defend it against its enemies.87 For Lubbe, Schmitt’s theories serve 
as a whetstone to sharpen liberalism, and provide an edge for philosophical debate. Such an 
approach, born in the aftermath of war and the collapse of the power of the Third Reich, is 
also evidence of a contingent specifically German response to those elements of Nazi theory 
that had been triumphant for so long. However, that justification, ‘a defence of liberalism’ 
looks shabby 50 years later. Today it has been totally detached from those contemporary 
pressures that drove post-war German philosophers to ‘defeat’ Nazism and its intellectual 
influence in the post-war German state.  
 
In spite of this, theorists’ fascination with Nazi theory continues, assisted by Schmitt’s post-
war tactics; specifically his ability to remain silent about his Nazi past, a habit fully 
established by the 1950s. This, combined with a German culture of silence discussed above, 
allowed Schmitt to partially re-invent himself in later years, for example when he and his 
theories were adopted by the new left in Italy and Germany.88 In the post-war period, 
although permanently banned from the universities, (as already noted, the only law professor 
so punished) for his notorious Nazi stance, Schmitt kept up his academic contacts and met 
students ‘off campus’, beginning at Heidelberg in the 1950s. One of those former students, 
Sombert, has admitted that in those meetings, it was not ‘normal’ that he and his fellow 
students accepted Schmitt’s silence concerning his Nazi past: ‘we accepted the silence and 
thereby justified it. That was undoubtedly how he wanted it. Someone who is not asked 
cannot owe an answer.’89 As a result, by the 1980s, Schmitt was increasingly portrayed as 
an individual scholar rather than a Nazi ‘case’. This perception, of Schmitt as the great 
European intellectual and man of letters rather than a political or legal theorist in any ‘narrow’ 
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sense, characterises much Schmittian scholarship both within and beyond critical legal 
theory. Muller notes: 
Directly or indirectly, Schmitt was treated as a classic who merited careful decoding. 
One could go so far as to claim that Schmitt’s trap had finally sprung shut. The self-
mythologisation he had put so much effort into, paid off after his death. Schmitt’s 
hermetic, self-consciously myth-making approach led to ever more hermeneutics – 
the kind of hermeneutics in which the German approach to the history of political 
thought and theory excels. 90  
 
To conclude this section, there is much to concern scholars in the lives of German 
academics who maintained their careers under Nazi rule. Their post-war lives are 
characterised by silence, mis-direction and dishonesty, originating from multiple motives. 
Although the Nazis failed in their project, academics had played their full part in ‘legitimating’ 
the Fascist state. Their contribution played a major role not only in the legal mind-set of 
German lawyers in 1945 but also in the response of many of those accused of war crimes 
and tried in Allied military courts. The ubiquitous ‘defence’ of obeying orders horridly echoed 
Schmitt’s creation of the amorphous ‘concrete orders’ where, crudely put, law was created 
by the will of the people or the Fuhrer and so expressed by Nazi judges in Special Courts. In 
post-war Germany many like Schmitt, re-formulated and adapted their position to appear 
more acceptable to intellectuals in Western democracies. As a result, this writer suggests 
that their work should be approached as LaCapra suggests. Academics should challenge 
the quarantine or delimiting of questions of subject-positions and adopt a narrative voice that 
permits a researcher to avoid confronting aspects of the principal text. More specifically, 
LaCapra is concerned with the problem of transference and the manner in which it links the 
individual and society premised on dichotomies of subjective/objective, public/private. In 
brief, he suggests that theorists who make a passing reference to a Nazi past are operating 
a metaphorical safety valve that draws off and releases forces that are explicitly prevented 
from exerting pressure in the principal text.91 This will be explored further through the case 
study below.   
  
6 On Schmitt in Modern Legal Theory: Not Waving but Drowning92 
It may seem that this work has travelled a considerable distance from Belsen in 1945 yet 
Schmitt represents one element of the transgressive Nazi state that legitimated those 
monstrous crimes the British Army confronted and investigated.  As such, it does seem 
peculiar that any element of that Nazi legal culture should be embraced as having value 
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today. This final section illuminates some of the disquiet expressed in this article; namely, 
the power of silence, the reception of Nazi theory and the current ahistorical orthodoxy as 
one strand within legal theory. The challenges set by the Nazi regime are without parallel in 
the European legal tradition, their crimes still uncounted. In spite of this, some critical legal 
scholars find virtue and value in ‘testing’ Western legal systems against that Nazi 
scholarship, absent of full recognition of its Nazi genesis. This article has briefly considered 
one example, that concerning Schmitt and International Law.  
 
This section will consider another, published in 2007, by Michael Salter and Susan Twist.93 
Salter has also recently (2012) published a work on Schmitt: Carl Schmitt: Law as Politics, 
Ideology and Strategic Myth.94 That work provides a decontextualised account of Schmittian 
theory, with what reads like an add-on final chapter acting as a LaCapra-esque ‘safety 
valve’. It could be argued that his approach continues the West German ‘silence’ that once 
surrounded the Nazi past, thereby importing silence into a strand of CLT. Both Salter’s work 
and Schmitt’s role in modern theory have been considered elsewhere by Loumansky, in a 
scholarly article which questions the adoption of Schmitt by some members of her discipline. 
She considers the use of Schmitt in critical legal theory as a cul-de-sac that is anathema to 
the protection of human rights.95 It must be emphasised that the position adopted by Salter 
and Twist stands on the margins of CLT, but also that it does personify the end point of that 
position. Both because, and in spite of, this, as an illustration of the themes of this article, the 
Salter and Twist contribution to CLT has a number of additional elements that make it 
relevant to this study. Firstly it is accessible to readers as it is free to access on line. 
Secondly, unlike Loumansky, both Salter and Twist have both published research on Nazi 
war crimes which is inherently historical, thus emphasising their deliberate choice of an 
ahistorical methodology.96 Thirdly, in 1999 Salter published a nuanced account of Schmitt, 
the ‘fascist jurist’ at Nuremberg, contextualising that account both historically and within 
subsequent intellectual critiques of Schmitt’s work.97 Finally the work draws on Schmitt’s 
seminal and notoriously Nazi work, published in 1934 as a source.  
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The basic position of the Salter-Twist article is an analysis of the ‘perennial status of 
discretion as a feature of any conceivable modern legal system’; drawing upon the 
application and value of Schmitt’s ‘concrete orders’.98 On a positive note, the authors join 
their voices to an urgent and important call for the end of an artificial divide between law and 
politics, much as Hutchinson and others have suggested for theory, history and politics. 
However, Salter and Twist do not extend that interdisciplinarity to history. Thus it is ironic 
that in their silences concerning Schmitt’s full and successful Nazi past they therefore 
separate law, history and politics thereby intellectually sabotaging their own declared aims. 
In continuing this culture of Schmittian silence they also perpetuate and reflect the very 
positivism they appear to be criticising below. Of course, this returns to the very substance of 
this article; does the lack of detail concerning Schmitt’s Nazi history delegitimise the 
academic approach? One further point, the text selected as the intellectual foundation for 
their critical analysis is cited throughout as On the Three Types of Juristic Thought (2004), 
the date of its first publication in English. But Über die Drei Arten was published in 1934 as 
Schmitt reached ambitiously towards the height of his influence and power within the new 
Nazi State; being based upon two public lectures given then.99 The work contains another of 
Schmitt’s better-known anti-Semitic statements, transparent as such to his contemporary 
audience: 
There are peoples that, without territory, without a state, and without a church, exist 
only in ‘law’. To them normativisit thought is the only reasonable legal thought, and 
every other type of thought appears inconceivable, mystical, fantastical or 
ridiculous.100 
 
Consequently, both the brief dismissal of Schmitt’s Nazi past combined with the absence of 
an original publication date (both in text and bibliography) provided by the article 
deconstructed here underline what increasingly appears as the disingenuous choice of an 
ahistorical methodology by Salter and Twist.  
 
In addition, considerable critical scholarship has previously been devoted to Über die Drei 
Arten. For example Hayek notes Schmitt’s position that law must not consist of abstract rules 
that make possible the formation of spontaneous order by the free actions of individuals 
through limiting the range of their actions. Rather law is to be the instrument of arrangement 
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or organisation by which the individual is to be made to serve concrete purpose.101 In 
adopting Schmitt’s ‘concrete orders’ as a base line for their jurisprudential position, Salter 
and Twist consider that proposition in the context of dichotomies inherent within liberalism. 
Specifically, that liberalism’s positivist assertions currently co-exist with the ‘routine’ exercise 
of discretion, and therefore this antinomony undermines the intellectual integrity of the 
liberal-positivist position. This is further explored through analysis of family law ‘decisions’ 
reached by District Judges. There is an inherent paradox in adopting this methodology. 
Tragically, Nazi judges indulged in unrestrained interpretation under the juristic authority of 
‘concrete order formation’, on a scale unimaginable in modern Western legal systems, 
resulting in deaths sentences or concentration camp imprisonment for tens of thousands of 
German citizens.102  
 
It is thus within all these contexts that the dangers of ahistoricity must be used to frame a 
consideration of the value of the work: it matters how much of the Nazi past is acknowledged 
in the Salter-Twist article. Sadly, there is very little, and neither do Salter and Twist situate 
their work within that long history of Schmittian critical scholarship, except to note that it 
exists. True they do not abandon a sense of history. However, instead of looking at the 
context of their core source (something normally essential for good history), they instead 
adopt an alternative and so less relevant historiography for this exercise: one specifically 
concerned with other developments in British legal studies. Thus: ‘The collapse of the 
credibility of Marxism….The decline of the mind-numbing positivism of traditional black letter 
scholarship, with its spurious and threadbare dichotomy between law and politics’, and the 
rise the of socio-legal studies movement form their intellectual context. They conclude that 
Such factors have removed the questionable excuse from excluding Schmitt from 
legal scholarship on the grounds that, despite holding professorial posts in top 
German university law schools, he remained a suspiciously political rather than a 
distinctly legal writer.103 [Author’s italics](S-T, p. 2) 
  
In truth, Schmitt was never a professor after 1945. The authors are, however, following that 
early post-war German tradition of adopting Schmitt’s theory to test the tenets and 
presumptions inherent within liberalism:  
classical forms of liberal thought and ideology construct and justify their traditionally 
negative view of administrative and judicial discretion in the decision-making work of 
civil servants, judges and other officials responsible for the interpretation and 
application of law to specific factual contexts. His theory of liberalism’s entrenched 
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assumptions and values provides a possible although challenging and controversial 
explanation of this negative reaction.  
 
 As noted earlier, that tradition, dating from Germany in the 1950s, included full 
acknowledgement of Schmitt’s Nazi past. However, the sole historical reconstruction within 
the selected text is exceedingly brief, it opens the article: 
There is little doubt that legal scholarship is currently witnessing a considerable 
revival of interest in the controversial writings of German jurist Carl Schmitt (1888-
1985).  Schmitt’s reputation suffered from his brief and deplorably opportunistic 
collaboration with the Third Reich between 1933-36 [sic] … Our concern is not with 
Schmitt the person but discussing the possible contemporary utility of a broadly 
Schmittian perspective, particularly his critique of mainstream liberal thought about 
law. The question of the validity or errors in his analysis of liberalism is obviously 
distinct from the personal, political or religious motivations he possessed for making 
these criticisms.104  
     
In this adoption of LaCapra’s metaphorical ‘safety valve’, the authors tap into an implicit 
intellectual ‘truth’; that in our liberal democratic society, there is a presumption that such an 
approach will not be read as support for Nazism. Discharging the past permits these writers 
to both subvert and contain ethical pressures produced by those Nazi elements within their 
selected text. However, acknowledging Schmitt as a Nazi legal academic writing in 1934 to 
both impress and bolster the Nazi state has potential relevance to a reading of the 
substantive discussion. Within this context, the reader is asked to accept Schmitt’s definition 
of ‘liberalism’, without that definition being fully exposed as a Nazi ideological attack on the 
rights of the individual. Indeed, Schmitt’s definition of ‘liberalism’ within Über die Drei Arten 
contains two elements of very specific historicity, the first that of ‘liberal positivism’ as 
constructed intellectually in 1934 Germany. In following Schmitt, Salter and Twist deduce 
that within [Schmittian-defined] liberalism: ‘there will always exist a single correct answer to 
any legal answer’;105 that liberalism suggests: ‘legal certainty can be achieved because it is 
possible for suitably trained lawyers to identify the essence of law as consisting of a system 
of autonomous and internally coherent rules’.106 Even that ‘Students of family law are 
supposed to learn the case law only to illustrate family law doctrine, not the vagaries of 
judicial practice in the area’.107 If it is difficult for the reader to recognise modern law teaching 
or contemporary doctrinal legal scholarship (however ‘mind-numbing’) in these assertions, 
this is hardly surprising.  
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It is the second element of historicity within this presentation of Schmitt’s account of 
liberalism/positivism that explains this oddity. Namely it is that Schmitt’s ‘understanding’ of 
the fundamental nature of liberalism as inherently positivist is constructed from his 
interpretation of nineteenth century French and German (doctrinal) legal history, plus the 
writings of Bentham and Austin.108 This article is not concerned with the intellectual 
provenance of Schmitt’s jurisprudence, but rather how scholars currently appropriate his 
work. It is noticeable that the authors are rather let down by that Nazi theorist in specifically 
adopting his account of liberalism to expose weaknesses in English law. In Über die Drei 
Arten Schmitt excludes the English common law system from his broad liberal-positivist 
critique, referring to the: ‘… autochthonous way of thinking of the insular English legal 
practice’. Interestingly however, Schmitt asserts that in certain of its aspects English case 
law may embody an example of ‘concrete order thinking’ [sic].109  
 
There are other matters of concern within the content of those two speeches included in 
Über die Drei Arten, for example their fulsome support for the Fuhrer.110 Christi provides a 
translation of one extract that differs from Bendersky’s but which is closer to the original 
text.111 
The new public and administrative law has put forth a foundational principle, the 
Fuhrerprinzip, together with notions like loyalty, devotion, discipline and honour, 
which can only be understood from the point of view of a concrete order and 
community.112 
 
This is how the work was written and positively received by its contemporary National 
Socialist audience.  
 
In short, reconstructing elements of that specific historicity embedded within Schmitt’s 
writings permits alternative readings to emerge from the Salter-Twist article. This challenges 
other facets of their choice of the 1934 writings. One such occurs in their introduction:  
Schmitt’s analysis differs from internal critics of liberal self-images of the legal system 
because it is carried out from a position that is radically detached from the deepest 
presuppositions of liberalism itself, something that makes possible his uniquely 
remorseless, thorough-going and systematic critique. It is the paradoxes of liberalism 
viewed through the telescopic sights of a sniper’s rifle.113 
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This revealing metaphor, in its loaded vocabulary, mirrors Schmitt’s own text. Its macho tone 
sits oddly with Salter and Twist’s choice of contemporary legal subject, family law. In their 
article, these authors consider (amongst other matters) aspects of Schmitt’s theory via 
exemplars drawn from English family law practice; in an amended version of that 
methodology developed successfully by Carline. That writer has examined decided cases of 
women who kill their abusive partners, read through the lens of Judith Butler’s theory, testing 
legal suppositions and assertions empirically.114 Her work, in reading Court of Appeal 
decisions amongst others through queer theory, illuminates how women, victims of long term 
domestic abuse, are constructed within the doctrinal black-letter framework of criminal law. 
Carline demonstrates the inherent patriarchal legal notions of women in domestic 
relationships, how the feminine is constructed as ‘passive’ and so on. Those women who fail 
to conform to entrenched societal and cultural norms (shared at least by the predominantly 
male judiciary) are treated more harshly within the legal system. The reader in turn, is free to 
revisit those cases and judge the validity of Carline’s conclusions for herself. However, 
Salter and Twist’s approach differs. For those authors, ‘family law practice’ consists of 
various anecdotal accounts of District Court hearings, first instance, confidential and 
unreported.  
 
There are other differences between Carline’s methodology and that adopted within the 
article under discussion. In summary, Carline adopts non-legal theory to illuminate and 
challenge the fundamentally sexist and discriminatory nature of English law. Contrarily, 
Salter and Twist adopt a 1930s Schmittian perspective to take issue with the nature of 
liberal-decision-making in family law matters, concluding that it fails in its self-declared (or 
perhaps Schmittian-declared) purposes:  
Liberalism insists that, within a modern liberal regime characterised by the rule of law 
and an independent judiciary, to be largely “determinate” that is, definable, stable and 
fixed. Indeed the determinacy of legal doctrines positively reinforces the rule of law. 
This is because state officials, including judges are positively [sic] required to adhere 
to pre-defined, precise and clear standards, which allow little scope for discretion.115 
 
In consequence of this narrow definition, any exercise of discretionary judicial decision-
making is held to support the Schmittian critique of liberalism. Furthermore, other aspects of 
Salter and Twist’s discussion resonate with Schmitt’s worldview: ‘family law necessarily 
draws upon pre-existing and independently constituted “concrete order” of family life, as this 
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is being concretely lived and experienced by family members’.116 The Schmittian perspective 
is underlined as they consider Schmitt to be: ‘Ostensibly cognisant’ of ‘family’ as constituting: 
‘a concrete inner order, discipline and honour [sic]’, suggesting Schmitt would have 
celebrated the ‘no order’ presumption (under s1(4) Children’s Act 1989) that aims to 
preserve ‘the pre-existing informal governance of the family’.117 In addition, Salter and Twist 
present a narrow concept of what constitutes a ‘family’ (husband, wife, etc). The final aspect 
concerns occasional uses of an unreconstructed linguistic turn, for example, ‘alleged 
domestic violence’ or ‘the mother purportedly a victim’.118  Ironically, these elements echo 
what Sombart (who had regular meetings with Schmitt after the war) has identified as 
Schmitt’s ‘fear of the feminine’. In fact, Sombart characterises Schmitt’s anti-liberalism as a 
‘psychological state.’119  
 
In summary, as Salter and Twist themselves underline, their article takes as its basis a 
decontextualised analysis of Schmitt’s 1934 text. In so doing, they deliberately adopt a 
position that sidesteps any real discussion of the responsibility of the individual and the 
implications of the influence of personal histories within political, philosophical and legal 
theory. Paradoxically however, they note how cultural norms may influence District Judges in 
arriving at their decisions.120 However, this example apart, their perspective explicitly avoids 
recognition of those elements of historical context, cultural norms and contingency inherent 
within all theory. This article suggests that, on the contrary, such an approach is vital when 
considering theory’s application to current issues; whether of law, politics or any other aspect 
of human life and experience.121 It is for the reader to decide his or her own position. 
 
Conclusion 
One further significant element has not been discussed within this article: that of denial; both 
the act of denying and of being in a state of denial. Post-war Germans commonly claimed 
that Hitler’s seizure of power was a kind of Betriebsunfall (industrial accident), something 
from outside that left German traditions unscathed. Such a view assisted both the post-war 
‘normalisation’ of Germany and the concealment of Nazi pasts. Thomas Mann speaking in 
1945 at the US Library of Congress presented an account not shared by most of his fellow 
Germans: ‘There are not two Germanys, an evil and a good, but only one, which through 
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devil’s cunning transformed its best into evil.’122 Mann was not overstating the extent to 
which educated Germans, the intellectuals, intelligentsia and professional classes turned 
their intellects over to the service of the Fascist dictatorship of the Third Reich.  
 
If this account damns academics, it must be acknowledged that German legal theorists did 
not create Nazi ideology. However as Stolleis affirms, they significantly assisted in the 
creation of a cultural and legal milieu that justified and supported that ideology. Hence this 
writer’s concern that legal theorists are privileging historically contingent Nazi theory. In so 
doing, are they colluding, however unwittingly with the Nazi project? Do such uses, absent 
specific and accurate historical context, legitimate aspects of mind-sets that initiated the 
Holocaust, signified the end of human rights in Nazi Germany and the deaths of so many in 
pursuit of a New World Order?123 Furthermore, do academics in bolstering an intellectual 
stance that claims to strengthen the liberal project by a rigorous critique based upon the 
writings of an opportunist Nazi theorist in fact destabilise and weaken democratic liberalism? 
This is not a plea for censorship, rather a request that theorists take a moment to consider 
the human and historical elements always present in any work they adopt as part of their 
intellectual canon. Indeed, we should ask; why must theory so often deconstruct from the 
negative?  
 
Derrida apart, all words have an author, all writers have motives and these may include 
malice, cruelty and political aims opposed to human decency. Schmitt’s career and ambition 
stand far removed from those British WCIT soldiers who attempted to retain their sense of 
decency as they moved through a hell created by the Nazi regime supported and legally 
legitimated by Schmitt amongst others. This (legal) historian suggests therefore, that certain 
aspects of critical legal theory discussed in this article, are founded upon utopian aims that 
suggest theory can be abstracted both from its human creators and its historical context, to 
reveal ‘hidden’ truths about our very real present. This constitutes a seductive intellectual 
game, but a dangerous one, particularly when it provides, as it did in the Nazi past, a de-
humanised ethos to current cultural milieu. Accordingly, both following and building upon 
LaCapra’s suggestion, this article suggests that ‘there is a need in critical theory for an 
explicitly [historical and] ethical turn.’124  
 
Finally, in a time of oppression, most do not resist; in a country that is occupied, many 
collaborate. Neither situation exists in modern Britain but, as this article contends, there is 
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both a ‘history’ and a developing orthodoxy of what might almost be characterised as 
intellectual collaboration with aspects of the National Socialist project. It may be that the 
reader feels this is overstating the case. Perhaps so, but this is not an issue that is always 
debated where one might expect to find it, within scholarship revisiting those theories. This 
lends support to the argument that [critical] legal theory is engaged in a dangerous flirtation 
with Schmitt and is currently in denial about his very shady past. The helical structure of this 
article has allowed this writer to range from past to present, from war crimes to theory. The 
heart of this piece is individual people, their actions and their personal responsibilities and 
those connections concerning fundamental ethical issues concerning law and legal 
scholarsip that link Schmitt and Genn. To return to the title of the piece, the article suggests 
that some legal theory is embracing politics. The question is: will the dark side capture it 
again? 
 
 
